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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX: BEQUESTS TO ORGANIZATIONS
ENGAGED IN INFLUENCING LEGISLATION
SECTION 2055(a) of the Internal Revenue Code' permits a deduction
from a decedent's gross estate for the amount of a bequest "to or for
the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively for re-
ligious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes' . . . no
substantial part of the activity of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation." 3 Two recent decisions
involving interpretation of the statute have reached conflicting results
with respect to the scope of this statutory prohibition.
In Dulles v. Johns.on,4 the testator bequeathed portions of a large
estate to several New York bar associations. His executors claimed a
charitable deduction for the bequests in the decedent's federal estate tax
return. The district court' held that the bequests were not deductible
because the bar associations "exist primarily to benefit members of the
legal profession, and to provide a method whereby their views . . . on
legislation.., is made known to the legislators."' The Court of Appeals
reversed and allowed the deduction, holding that the questioned
activities7 of the bar associations are "educational and charitable" and
' The section under consideration in the cases discussed is Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch.
ix, § 8x2(d), 53 STAT. I (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2o55(a)). The section
from the 1939 Code has remained substantially unchanged except that § 2055(a)(4.)
has been added. Other sections of the code favoring charitable organizations use sub-
stantially the same language. See § 5o(c) (3) (income tax exemption) ; § 170(c) (2)
(income tax deduction) ; § 2522(a) (2) (gift tax) i § 3 121(b) (8) (B) (social security).
'Under § 2o55 (a) (3) trusts, fraternal societies, or associations operating under the
lodge system need not be "organized and operated exclusively" for charitable purposes,
so long as the particular bequest is "used exclusively" for such purposes.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a) (z). A similar limitation under-§ 2o55 (a) (3)
extends to bequests to trusts, fraternal societies or associations under the lodge system.
Only gifts to governmental bodies under § zo55 (a) (x) and veterans' organizations in-
corporated by act of Congress under § 2055(a) (4) are not limited in this way.
'273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. x959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (i96o).
'Dulles v. Johnson, 155 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
'Id. at 279.
' The court emphasized in its discussion four activities in which the organizations
engaged and on which the district court appeared to have based its conclusion not to
allow the deduction. They were: (i) regulation of the unauthorized practice of 'law;
(2) institution of disciplinary measures for professional misconduct of members of the
bar and judiciary; (3) recommendations with respect to judicial administration and
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that the organizations clearly perform a public service through their
activities and do not thereby "seek to achieve a selfish professional
benefit."'  In contrast to this decision is League of Women Voters v.
United States.9 There the Court of Claims held that, although the
League is a nonpartisan association organized to give the female voter
practical experience in making political decisions,'0 its practice of taking
positions on legislative issues prevented gifts to the League from quali-
fying for the estate tax deduction.
The Dulles and League cases raise the question of whether a chari-
table organization" that devotes a substantial part"2 of its activities in
attempting to influence legislation is disqualified as the recipient of a
deductible contribution, if the legislation it seeks is not designed to
procedure and the endorsement of candidates for judicial office; (4) activities in support
of or in opposition to various legislative proposals.
8 "These activities serve no selfish purpose of the legal profession-rather they
constitute an expert's effort to improve the law in technical and non-controversial
areas." Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).
i 8o F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 8zz (196o).
10 The articles of incorporation of the League of Women Voters provide:
The business and objects of the corporation shall be to promote political responsi-
bility through informed and active participation of citizens in government; to render
such other services in the interest of education in citizenship as may be possible; and
to do every act appropriate or necessary to carry out any of the foregoing objects.
The corporation shall not support or oppose any political party or candidate.
22 The statute requires that organizations receiving the deductible gift be "organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes. . . ." § 2055(a) (2). As interpreted by the courts, "organized and operated
exclusively" means only that any nonconforming activities must be incidental to the
organization's program. See Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.zd 907 (6th Cir.
1955) ; cf. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945). See
generally I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 12.19 (1942). Under this
interpretation, the bar associations in the Dulles case qualified as charitable organiza-
tions. Organizations such as the League of Women Voters have similarly qualified.
Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 12z F. Supp. 759 (D.C. Ky. 1954).
"a It is evident that Congress did not intend to exclude all organizations which are
concerned with legislation from qualifying as organizations to which deductible contri-
butions can be made, since only those groups which devote a "substantial part" of their
activities to propaganda and attempting to influence legislation are disqualified as
recipients of charitable contributions. This view has previously been accepted under
the common law definition of charitable organizations. In the United States, courts
have accepted the proposition that some "reforms can be accomplished only by a change
in the law, and there seems to be no good reason why the mere fact that they can be
accomplished only through legislation should prevent them from being valid charitable
purposes." 4 Sco'T, TRUSTs § 374.4 at 2677 (zd ed. 1956). Yet even under the
common law decisions, organizations whose purposes are purely political in character
are not considered charitable. Id. at § 374.6.
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further the interests of the organization itself, but to benefit the public
generally. 13
An organization receiving the benefit of this deduction is, in effect,
being subsidized by the Government and, in turn, by the community at
large. Consequently, it is believed that only organizations that benefit
the community should be accorded this preferential treatment. Chari-
table trusts present an analogous situation. "A trust will not be upheld
as charitable unless the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust is
of benefit ... to the community. A trust may fail because the class of
persons who are to benefit is so narrow that the community has no
interest in the performance of the trust."'4 A similar approach should
be utilized in determining the organizations that qualify for deductible
gifts. For example, in a case involving the income tax,'15 a lawyer
donated money to the Missouri Institute for the Advancement of
Justice, an organization composed of both lawyers and laymen whose
purpose was the establishment by constitutional amendment of a more
desirable system for the selection of judges." The Tax Court dis-
allowed the deduction as a contribution to a charitable organization,
holding that it was deductible as a "business expense" of the lawyer."
Thus, contributors who were not lawyers were precluded from gaining
'a The statutory requirement that "no substantial part of the activities of the organi-
zation be carrying on propaganda or otherwise influencing legislation" was added to the
code in 1934, yet the reasons for its presence have never been adequately explained.
78 CoNG. REC. 5959 0934). Apparently, the legislative enactment codified existing
administrative and judicial policy, since, even prior to the amendment, some courts had
reasoned that a gift did not qualify for the deduction if a substantial part of the or-
ganization's activities were political because it was not organized "exclusively" for the
charitable purposes listed in the statute. See Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d
Cir. 1930). See generally i PAUL, op. cit. supra note xi, at 12.17. The simplest
approach in applying the statute would be to interpret it literally. However, because
of the way it is worded, even the legislators enacting the amendment feared that such
an interpretation would deny the deduction "to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children, to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, or any of the
worthy organizations that the statute does not in the slightest mean to affect." 17
CONG. REC. 5861 (1934)
14 Sco-r, op. cit. supra note iz, at 2700.
'GLuther Ely Smith v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 696 (x944). The case concerns
§ 170(c) (2), an income tax provision which uses substantially the same language as
the sections under consideration.
a This movement was prompted by a general feeling in the community that the
local judiciary was controlled by unwholesome political influences. One result of this
feeling was a disinclination to litigate causes before the local courts.
"' Admittedly, the lawyer could expect some benefit in this activity since a corrupt
court system meant fewer cases.
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the deduction. Obviously, the court failed to consider the substantial
benefit the organization bestowed upon the community. Nothing could
be so offensive to the public as a corrupt judiciary and nothing so bene-
fidal as an organization which could remedy the situation. A gift to
such an organization should qualify for the deduction.
The groups to be disqualified should be those "seeking to influence
the passage of legislation that will be of direct financial interest to them-
selves or to the concern or association which they represent."" It
should be noted that only governmental bodies and veterans' organiza-
tions are exempt from the prohibition against "influencing legislation.""'
The public benefit of contributions to the government is sufficiently
obvious. It is equally obvious that a primary purpose of veterans' or-
ganizations is to promote legislation that will benefit the organizatio4
and its members. It would seem that Congress, in specifically exempt-
ing veterans' organizations from the limitations of the amendment, in-
tended that other organizations of similar purpose, rather than organi-
zations which benefit the community, be denied the deduction.
In Dulles v. Johnson, the court pointed out that the bar associations
do not promote legislation of direct benefit to the organization or its
members.20  A major portion of their work is "of a technical nature
in volving the adequacy of proposed and existing legislation in relation
to other law." Similarly, the League of Women Voters derives no
selfish benefit from the legislation it promotes. Rather, its efforts are
directed at areas of substantial public interest and concern, such as the
strengthening of the United Nations and supporting United States
ratification of the North Atlantic Pact. -' The League attempts to
promote better government generally; the bar associations attempt to
free the courts from corruption and the injustice that results from delay
and procedural impasse. Neither organization is engaged in a "drive
or lobbying for legislation that has for its purpose the serving of the
interests of a limited or selfish group."-" Rather, their activities "inure
to the benefit of all citizens and tend to promote sound government.
2 3
These organizations should be among those to whom gifts are en-
couraged.
"8League of Women Voters v. United States, xSo F. Supp. 379, 384 (Ct. Cl. 1960)
(dissenting opinion).
19 See note 3 supra.
2
°Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.zd 362, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).
'League of Women Voters v. United States, 1So F. Supp. 379, 381 (Ct. Cl. 196o).
2'1d. at 383 (dissenting opinion).23 Ibid.
[Vol. 196k:155
Vol. 196i: 155] FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 159
The League of Women Voters decision is justifiable under a literal
interpretation of the statute. However, it is believed that the court in
Dulles v. Johnson, in considering the purposes of the organizations in
question and the effect of their legislative activity upon the community,
reaches a result more nearly in accord with the objectives of the statute.
